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Abstract 
How and from where can power be criticized and resisted? The advent of new managerial forms of 
power has brought the question once more to the fore. One salient issue is whether the ubiquity 
and apparent omnipotence of contemporary forms of managerial power renders critique and 
resistance difficult. The reason for raising this issue is that critique/resistance tends to be co-opted 
by managerial power, which means that the former turns out to invigorate rather than undermine 
the latter. Thus, critique/resistance faces the paradox that it strengthens what it sets out to weaken. 
It is in this light the article sets out to compare the critical potential of French pragmatic 
sociology and Foucauldian-inspired genealogy. We argue that both approaches offer viable 
critiques of contemporary forms of power. Yet, whereas the critique of pragmatic sociology hinges 
on the position (locus) of those who exercise critique and/or resist, genealogical critique depends 
on the concrete form (modus) of power that is being scrutinized. While we find it more promising 
to focus on the forms of power and how they operate than on the source of the critique levelled 
against these powers, the two approaches can inspire each other methodologically in order to 
advance critiques of practices of power which are considered repressive. 
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Over the last few decades, political and social theorists across a wide range of disciplinary 
and moral convictions seem to agree that contemporary liberal democracies are pervaded 
by new and pervasive forms of power that make resistance difficult. Whether seen as 
neoliberal hegemonic discourses (Bourdieu, 1998; Harvey, 2005), global capitalism 
(Harvey, 2004; Zizek, 2008), empire (Hardt & Negri, 2000) or network society (Castells, 
2000), subtle and usually non-coercive forms of power have permeated every capillary of 
the societal fabric and have created a new capitalist (work) culture (Sennett, 2006). This 
type of diagnoses are not new but was devised in various forms by members of the 
Frankfurt School (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1997; Marcuse, 1964). So effective are 
contemporary forms of capitalist power that many political and social theorists are 
increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of resistance and critique. Maybe another 
explanation is that typical leftist types of “total critique” of capitalism and the system have  
run into a dead-end.  
 
At least, this kind of total critique often results in the rather pessimistic conclusion that 
critique often serves to rejuvenate existing power relations rather than upsetting them. 
Thus, it has been argued that critical discourses and practices are part and parcel of the 
development and management of organizations (Messner, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2011). 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) have gone further and argued that the anti-authoritarian 
and potentially revolutionary discourses of autonomy and self-realization that were aired 
in the 1960s and 1970s have degraded into managerial discourses serving to govern the 
labour force in new ways, thereby paving the way for new forms of networked or project-
based capitalism. Seen from this perspective, critique has turned out to be a contribution 
rather than an obstacle to the development of capitalism. From this, it is concluded that in 
today’s societies there is hardly room for critical practices that interrogate and modify 
existing power relations. Nonetheless, one could ask if the co-optation of critique testifies 
to the fact that power relations have undergone significant changes, even if the novel 
power relations have not done away with capitalism. The question is if the object of 
critique has to be capitalism as a whole or whether critique should rather focus on specific 
arrangements at workplaces and other societal settings? 
 
However, exercising critique in specific and concrete ways is not on the agenda of several 
influential Marxist-inspired critics for whom total critique necessarily requires 
revolutionary options. Hardt & Negri (2000, 2005) coined the term ‘multitude’ to 
designate a space for revolutionary politics that would supplant the contemporary 
modality of power, i.e. empire. Similarly, Zizek (2008, pp. 159, 170-171) resorts to quasi-
religious notions of divine violence as the only really effective way to unsettle 
contemporary forms of global capitalism. This vitalistic yet pessimistic predicament of 
critique found among influential social theorists has to do not only with how they 
approach critique but also with what they criticize, power, which are in any case two sides 
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of the same coin. What we get here is a totalizing view of power – be that in the form of 
neoliberalism, finance capitalism, empire or simply “capitalism”. We find this approach 
problematic, because the anti-system/capitalism of total critique blocks a more adequate 
take on the nature of power today and forms of critique and resistance.  
 
How to criticize and resist power is a broad question. To be manageable, we embark on a 
comparative discussion of Michel Foucault’s analytics of government and Luc Boltanski, 
Laurent Thévenot and Eve Chiapello’s pragmatic sociology. Over the last two decades, 
they have engaged in discussions about how to address the relationship between critique 
and power. We have chosen these two comparable approaches because they represent 
elaborate attempts to conduct critique without resorting to epistemological and/or 
normative foundations, i.e. they try to undertake non-normative critique (Hansen, 2016). 
Here it should be noted that in talking about the two approaches - Foucauldian analytics / 
genealogy and pragmatic sociology -we are working at a certain level of abstraction. 
Foucault modified his analytical approach several times during his authorship (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982), and we also find some (growing) differences between Boltanski and 
Chiapello on the one hand, and Thévenot on the other (Hansen, 2016). In this article, we 
essentially treat them as two distinct and more or less coherent approaches, though we do 
touch briefly on certain differences regarding the understanding of capitalism within 
pragmatic sociology. The choice of genealogy and pragmatic sociology obviously implies 
excluding several other important strands of critical management and workplace studies 
(Alvesson, Bridgman, & Willmott, 2011). Notwithstanding this limitation, we seek to 
provide a more adequate understanding of critique of power by comparing the potential 
and limitations of pragmatic sociology and genealogy. Our aim is not to synthesize the 
two approaches (Andrade, 2015), although we conclude by discussing possibilities of 
mutual methodological inspiration in the study of practices of power and critique of or 
resistance to these practices. 
 
Our key argument is that both pragmatic sociology and genealogy offer viable critical 
approaches to contemporary forms of power, and both seek to shed the vestiges of 
Marxist-inspired critique. Yet, whereas the critique of pragmatic sociology hinges on the 
position (locus) of those who exercise critique and/or resist and the conception of 
capitalism as a totalising system that structures critique and resistance via various regimes 
of engagement and justification, genealogical critique depends on the concrete form 
(modus) of power being scrutinized. We find it more promising to focus on the forms of 
power than on the source of the critique levelled against these powers, and the subject 
position of those engaging in anti-system/capitalist critique. Having said that, however, it 
will be our argument that the two approaches can inspire each other methodologically in 
order to advance an understanding of critiques of power relations. 
 
The article is structured in four sections. First, we compare and discuss the genealogical 
and pragmatic sociological approaches to the relationship between power and critique. We 
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discuss the implications of where critique positions itself in relation to the norms and 
epistemological limits defined by contemporary modes of power. Second, using workplace 
management as our example, we compare the two accounts of contemporary power 
relations and their critiques. Third, we examine how they explain wider political strategies 
in modern capitalist states. Finally, we conclude by summarizing similarities and 
differences, and discuss their respective advantages and limitations. We will argue that the 
two takes on critique can profitably inspire each other. 
Power and critique  
 
Critique and resistance are paradigmatic for the Left, which has been linked up with truth 
and emancipation, both of which were self-evident reference points at least prior to the 
postmodern avalanche in the 1980s. Today, the former grand visions of emancipation have 
lost credibility and have been replaced by commonplace ideas of how people set out to 
criticise and resist repressive power relations. Although truth, reason and rationality were 
deconstructed ad infinitum, they have somehow managed to survive in certain parts of 
leftist academic discourses as a relic of the total critique tradition where they seem to be 
regarded as necessary for getting at the root cause of the malign mechanisms of 
capitalism. This in turn linked up with the certainty of being cognitively and morally 
superior to adversarial discourses (Bourdieu 1991, p. 163-170; Hardt & Negri, 2000).  
 
The sublimation of truth and morality authorises emancipatory movement, which is, in its 
classical formulation, a movement to end class-rule, power and, ultimately, politics. Based 
on the axiom that power and truth are antithetic, the fundamental strategy of this kind of 
critique is to reveal the true nature of the actions conducted by those in power. The aim is 
to show that the strategies used by elites/management serve the overall purpose of 
advancing their interests through manipulation and domination. The idea is that this will 
make those being oppressed realise they are exploited. Hence, critique as the speaking of 
truth to power is the take-off for resistance. 
 
Foucault’s power analytics is refuses to take truth as mandatory for critique and resistance. 
Pragmatic sociology is sceptical about the emancipatory potential of truth too, yet it clings 
on to the Marxist heritage of total critique inasmuch as capitalism is conceived of as the 
horizon of intelligibility for critique. This is particularly clear, as we will show below for 
Boltanski and Chiapello, whereas Thévenot seems to be increasingly sceptical about the 
use of capitalism as a horizon for understanding the functioning of critique. The issue at 
stake here is the position of critique vis-à-vis the power being criticised. This requires 
discussing how power connects with democratic values, and who is regarded as a 
legitimate subject of critique. This concern is far from new. Yet, present-day capitalism 
and the proliferation of indirect forms of power accentuate the need to answer these 
concerns. In the remainder of this section we compare and discuss similarities and 
differences between the two approaches to power and critique.  
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Pragmatic Sociological Critique: External or Internal Positioning?  
Pragmatic sociology, as expressed in the seminal work On Justification (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 1991/2006) and subsequent publications (Boltanski 2006; Thévenot 2006), is 
preoccupied with examining the moral and political horizons underpinning social action 
(Blokker, 2011). According to one of its leading exponents, pragmatic sociology is 
concerned with analysing how actors reflexively do different types of ‘justification work’, 
thereby criticising or justifying particular orders of worth in specific situations (Boltanski, 
2009b). The term pragmatic refers to discursive pragmatics, stressing the actors’ use of 
grammatical resources in facing certain situations, such as the exercise of power 
(Boltanski, 2006). Orders of worth is a key analytical device for pragmatic sociology that 
is utilized to understand the kinds of power, resistance and forms of emancipation that can 
be justified by a set of actors in a given political situation (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p. 
22-23).  
 
It is this notion of orders of worth that allows Boltanski and Chiapello to make a general 
distinction between corrective and radical forms of critique (2005, p. 32). The former 
conducts critique by trying to test existing modes of justification to gauge the possible 
distance between reality and the regulative ideals espoused by existing forms of 
justification. This is an internal or reformist mode of critique that seeks to improve 
existing modes of justification rather than abandon them. The radical form of critique 
adopts different principles: critique is external to the mode of justification criticized but 
internal to another regime of justification. Boltanski and Chiapello hold that this form of 
critique has often been termed ‘revolutionary’. Notwithstanding this distance from 
Marxist-inspired conceptions of critique, Boltanski and Chiapello maintain that critique 
must take place from a certain normative viewpoint, be that internal or external to that 
which is criticized.  
 
Apart from the generic distinction between external and internal critique, Boltanski and 
Chiapello (2005, pp. 37-38) distinguish between artistic and social critique of capitalism. 
Whilst the former revolves around disenchantment, inauthenticity and oppression, the 
latter revolves around the egoism of private interests and  growing economic disparities. 
The important thing is that Boltanski and Chiapello regard the relationship between 
critique and capitalism as dialectical. It is not only critique that feeds on its object, it is 
also that capitalism develops by taking up strands of critique (Boltanski & Chiapello, 
2005, p. 40). It is due to this functional relationship that “anti-capitalism is in fact as old as 
capitalism” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p. 36). Instead of abandoning the enterprise of 
critique because it is bound to be taken up by capitalism, they argue that even marginal 
changes resulting from critique may be worth pursuing. While Boltanski and Chiapello 
liken critique of capitalism to the work of Sisyphus: they maintain that critique of 
capitalism does hold an emancipatory potential – however limited and tentative (Boltanski 
and Chiapello 2005, p. 41). The liberal capitalism in the nineteenth century enabled 
emancipatory promises of autonomy and self-realization (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p. 
Triantafillou & Dyrberg  •   52	
	
OUTLINES - CRITICAL PRACTICE STUDIES • Vol. 20, No. 1 • 2019                                www.outlines.dk 
 
 
425), the organized capitalism of the early twentieth century promised social security 
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p. 201) and the recent neoliberal capitalism enables critique 
of and emancipation from state authorities and rigid rules in favour of a more flexible 
lifestyle (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p. 436). The three forms of capitalisms are 
functionally correlated with particular registers of critique and emancipatory hopes.  
 
For pragmatic sociology, the ability to conduct effective critique seems to hinge on the 
question from which vantage point – from within what order of worth or scientific position 
– critique of and resistance against power can and should be conducted. This affinity 
between the efficacy of critique and the place of its enunciation hinges on the conception 
of power in pragmatic sociology; and more specifically, it seems to be a remnant of 
Marxist theorisation according to which critique is ‘effective’ if it is a means used by 
workers to undermine capitalism. Efficiency and locus are thus closely entwined in this 
conception. In his analysis of regimes of engagement, Thévenot locates various forms of 
power with the oppression taking place when one regime prevails at the expense of 
another (Thévenot, 2011). The actors who constitute and navigate within these regimes 
may do so with ‘closed eyes’, explicitly or tacitly accepting the costs of such 
encroachment, or with ‘open eyes’, whereby they explicitly question such encroachment 
and open an avenue for different actions (Thévenot, 2011, pp. 53-56). According to 
Thévenot the critical role of the sociologist is to analyse with ‘open eyes’ by interrogating 
and explicating the costs and restrictions of engaging with particular regimes.  
 
Recently, the other founder of pragmatic sociology Boltanski appears to be increasingly 
dissatisfied with what he regards as the limited critical potential of pragmatic sociology. In 
On Critique, he calls for a supplement by a Bourdieu-inspired critical sociology in order to 
advance beyond the mapping of the critical actions and capacities of actors, as he finds the 
critical potentials of this internal approach ‘rather limited’ (Boltanski, 2011, p. 43). In 
contrast, critical sociology has the advantage of being able – by the use of sociological 
methods and a standpoint external to the studied actors – to map the ways by which 
domination and exploitation take place, which may subsequently be used by the 
dominated actors to ‘increase their critical capacities’ (Boltanski, 2011, pp. 44-45). It is 
necessary to develop a framework combining the mapping of actors’ grammar with critical 
sociology’s construction of societal totality. This illuminates patterns of domination and 
exploitation, allowing the authors to make a normative difference and contribute to the 
‘emancipation of the dominated classes’ (Boltanski, 2011, p. 154). 
 
In brief, pragmatic sociology is articulated both as a general theory of social action and as 
a critical analysis of social action. The key proponents of the theory largely agree on the 
general theory evolving around regimes of actions within orders of justification 
characterising various types of engagement. They also agree that critique is always 
articulated from within one or, possibly, more regimes of action and the moral horizon it 
delineates. Moreover, they initially agreed that the critical potential of pragmatic 
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sociology should be realised by way of mapping the critical capacities of actors moving 
within and between regimes. Even if Boltanski has disputed the utility of this descriptive 
approach and opted for a normativity to be explicated by the critical sociologist, the 
general point remains that the locus – both that of the researcher and that of the analysed 
actor – is crucial to undertake critical analysis. In other words, for pragmatic sociology the 
key issue involved in the question of how to conduct effective critique of power revolves 
more around the (epistemological and normative) position of those exercising critique than 
around the object of that critique, namely power in its various forms. 
	
Genealogical Critique: Problematizing Power in its Concrete Forms   
Foucault’s emphasis on power as government – ‘to structure the possible field of action of 
others’, which is ‘a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of 
their being capable of action’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 220) – suggests that power is a matter of 
shaping the abilities of individuals by coordinating and directing their space of action in 
ways that are aligned with contemporary political goals and wider social norms. He does 
not define power in terms of domination, just as he does not analyse power in terms of 
conflicting interests. This is not to say that he ignores aspects of domination in power 
relations. The point is simply to be open to all forms of power, both domination or 
coercive modalities, and those indirect forms of power that Foucault dubs government, 
which work by developing and structuring the ways in which individuals govern 
themselves. It follows that whilst power might encroach upon the freedom of those who 
are being governed, it also often relies on their freedom.  
 
Power and resistance are inextricably linked, and this implies that critique is a form of 
freedom that problematizes those exercises of power, which agents for whatever reason 
find inconvenient, dangerous, unfair, etc. (Foucault, 1986, p. 343; 1989). For Foucault, 
critique is a mode of resistance against particular forms of power. He offers this initial 
formulation: ‘the art of not being governed like that and at that cost’ and ‘the will not to be 
governed is always the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this 
price’ (1997a, p. 45, 75). Critique is a way of resisting geared to the relation between those 
who govern and those who are governed. This is the political authority relation dealing 
with the practices and reasons for governing (Oksala, 2007, pp. 86-87; Dyrberg, 2014, p. 
53). The object of critique is the danger of domination, which is characterised by a 
subversion of what he calls the strategic game of liberties (Foucault, 1997c, p. 299) that 
leaves little or no room for agents’ ability to criticise and hence resist the ways in which 
they are governed. This is the case, for instance, ‘[w]hen an individual or a social group 
manages to block a field of relations of power, to render them impassive and invariable 
and to prevent all reversibility of movement’ (Foucault, 1997c, p. 283, see also p. 292).  
 
To criticize power is not to reject it as such, which from Foucault’s point of view would 
not make sense, but to contest and possibly refuse specific ways of its exercise (Foucault, 
1997a, p. 44). Foucault distinguished between several forms of power in his analyses, 
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including sovereignty, discipline, biopower and the more recent liberal government. These 
forms of power link up in very different ways with the freedom of those over whom power 
is exercised. In very general terms, sovereignty works by way of domination, discipline by 
individual training and correction, biopower through state regulations targeting the 
population, whereas liberal government seeks to augment and direct the self-steering 
capacities of both individuals and organisations (Foucault, 2008). Liberal government then 
may be seen as a form of power exercised through rather than over the subject. The ethical 
question concerning power and freedom – which is related to the art of government – is 
how the growth of capabilities can be disconnected from the intensification of repression 
and domination (Foucault, 2007, p. 116). In short, critique sets out to examine how it is 
possible to minimize domination in the exercise of power. 
 
Foucault addresses this issue by asserting not only that critique has to be concrete and 
transformative by targeting specific practices of power; it must also be unprejudiced in 
two respects. First, one has to accept, contrary to conventional emancipatory wisdom, that 
those wielding power are able to tell the truth and exercise power in a way that does not 
have to be motivated by their own interests at the expense of others. Second, the raison 
d’être of critique is not to envision the good life and the normative straitjacket that goes 
with it, but to expand fields of possibilities. This is probably the reason he could not ‘help 
but dream about a kind of criticism that would not try to judge’ (Foucault 1988c, p. 326). 
It follows that a totalizing type of critique based on the vanguard assumption that it has a 
privileged access to the truth and adopts a moral high-ground is rejected as authoritarian. 
 
Critique involves adopting a limit-attitude in the sense of interrogating the limitations 
imposed by power from within existing power-knowledge relations, as it is illusory to 
think that it is possible to criticize from an external position. There is, says Foucault 
(1981, pp. 96-97, our italics), ‘no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of 
all rebellions or pure law of the revolutionary’ unaffected by governmentalization. 
Critique is rarely stultified by power. This is so because power does not make up a unified 
whole from which no escape is possible, and because such a whole or totality is an 
ideological abstraction. Obviously, critique cannot take place from somewhere external to 
the power being criticized, which is from some lofty God’s eye view. Yet, because 
critique for Foucault is not ‘a demolition job, one of rejection or refusal’ (Foucault, 1988a, 
p. 107), but has more to do with an investigative job, a reflexive and negotiated act, the 
practice of critique does not need to be external to power. This act of critical investigation 
should then consist not in finding a utopian outside of power but in ‘analysing and 
reflecting upon limits’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 113). The limits he has in mind are not abstract 
ideological doctrines but practical and ingrained in mundane set-ups embodied in 
institutions that govern individuals and populations. 
 
To practice criticism is, says Foucault (1988b, p. 155), ‘a matter of making facile gestures 
difficult’. This is radical as opposed to revolutionary politics: neither abstract nor utopian 
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but practical and aimed at the political ramifications of everyday life. It is a call for 
challenging the normal state of affairs, which is to say that critique as thoughtful activity 
creates a distance vis-à-vis problematization. It is a distancing from types of actions and 
behaviour, which makes them lose their familiarity and gives way for reflection and 
action. It is ‘the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, 
and reflects on it as a problem’ (Foucault, 1997b, p. 388). This mode of critique is a limit-
experience driven by engagement and curiosity, and it is the point where critical distance 
might become dangerous: to be frank and to state what one believes is to expose oneself to 
risk, which calls for personal integrity and courage. This is of critical importance for 
cultivating democratic values. 
 
Equally important for the cultivation of democratic values is that critique of and resistance 
to power involve courageous truth telling. This might take the form of telling truth to 
power, which is the typical idea of critique, but Foucault also allows for the possibility 
that political authorities can tell the truth and govern well. Both dimensions are part of his 
discussions of parrhesia. Power and truth do not then have to be antithetical (Foucault, 
2001). The kind of truth-telling Foucault deals with in his later works is one that seems at 
once irrelevant, because it does not suggest a new truth or a new course of action, and 
dangerous, because it exposes the costs to our freedom by this particular way of managing 
labour. His focus is thus on the modus of power as opposed to criticizing and resisting 
practices of power, because they stem from a particular locus such as the subject position 
of ‘the enemy’: capital or government. 
 
On the one hand, Foucault’s acknowledgement that truth-telling can challenge power 
relations by unravelling lies and interrogating the wisdom of political decisions is an 
important supplement to his analyses of the power-laden effects of the production of 
modern forms of truth-telling. He would readily accept that speaking truth to power may 
contest and unsettle the latter, which bears a resemblance to Boltanski and Chiapello’s 
‘open eyes’ (Hansen, 2016). On the other hand, he rejects that truth telling by default leads 
to emancipation. He rejects insurrectionary or revolutionary politics informed by a truth 
available only to the vanguard critic. This kind of reasoning is bound up with a demolition 
ethos, which implies being against everything associated with the establishment, such as 
political authorities and capitalist managers. However, if the purpose of critique is to 
interrogate, destabilize and perhaps reverse existing power relations, then critique must 
evolve around a meticulous analysis of the concrete assumptions, norms, administrative 
procedures, and techniques that are engaged in the exercise of power. For Foucault, the 
effectiveness of critique depends on paying attention to the forms of power being 
criticized, rather than from whom or where this critique is launched, and whether it takes 
aim at capitalism. In fact, the critique of such powers might take the form of telling truth 
to power exercised by academics and workers, but it can also be in the shape of critical 
reflections made by political authorities and/or workplace managers. 
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Table 1 Locus and Modus of Power and Critique (of Power) 
 Locus Modus 
Power ● Symbolic (knowledge, standards, classification 
systems, grammars of justification, etc.)	
● Material (regulations, procedures, techniques, 
modes of organization, architecture, etc.)	
● Via freedom (liberal 
government)	
● Repressive (discipline, 
sovereignty and biopower)	




● Direct resistance from workers	
 
Table 1 may be used as a crude illustration of the similarities and the differences between 
the two approaches with regard to their understanding of power and how best to criticize 
it. Both approaches pay detailed attention to the locus of power – in both its symbolic and 
material dimensions (upper left quadrant), and both acknowledge the importance of 
academic analysis and direct resistance from workers as viable forms of critique (lower 
right quadrant). However, they differ with regard to what it takes to make such critique 
effective. While Foucault seems to pay more attention to the modus of power, pragmatist 
sociology is more preoccupied with the locus of critique. 
 
Marco: Network Capitalism or Neoliberal Rationalities 
of Government  
Both pragmatic sociology and Foucauldian genealogy interrogate power relations at a 
macro or societal level. Both strands of inquiry imply that to render power and resistance 
intelligible in the world of work we need to address these in the local settings in which 
they are played out (micro), and through the wider economic and political forces and 
strategies taking place within and beyond state territories (macro). However, they differ in 
the ways they address the macro level and hence in their understanding of the relationship 
between the two levels. 
	
Boltanski and Chiapello: Critique and its Complicity with Capitalism  
Let us turn to Boltanski and Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005). While we 
find several other analyses of the world of work by pragmatist sociologists, they are 
mainly focused on individual organisations or mechanisms, such as certification 
(Thévenot, 2015a). The New Spirit of Capitalism seeks to explain changing forms of 
management and the critical discourses informing them in terms of capitalism as an 
economic, social and discursive system. It is economic by regulating the production and 
exchange of both material and immaterial goods. It is social by impinging on modes of 
employment, unemployment systems and the management of private companies. And it is 
discursive the extent to which the system is considered rational, manageable and 
Critique as Locus or Modus? •   57 
	
OUTLINES - CRITICAL PRACTICE STUDIES • Vol. 20, No. 1 • 2019                                www.outlines.dk 
 
 
legitimate through technical, managerial and moral discourses. The latter two discourses 
are especially important for Boltanski and Chiapello, as critique in the form of radical 
leftist problematizations of capitalism have become part of contemporary management 
discourses: what used to be a critical discourse on capitalism has turned out to be a source 
for justifying and rejuvenating capitalism. 
 
To understand the relationship between power and critique on these lines bears a 
resemblance to Marxist ideology critique although it is divested of dogmatic class 
analysis. Two points are important here. First, Boltanski and Chiapello see capitalism as a 
totalizing system that produces societal effects on the production and exchange of goods. 
Changing management and workplace practices can be explained with recourse to the 
contemporary morphology and functional needs of capitalism: “While capitalism has 
changed since its formation, its ‘nature’ has not been radically transformed”(Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005, p. 37). Even if capitalism can take different forms, it remains a system 
with generic functional needs to ensure its survival and development. Thus, even if the 
third and most recent form of capitalism (the neoliberal one) enables critique of and 
emancipation from state authorities and rigid rules, these gains are countered by 
casualization, job precariousness, and an alienating form of autonomy mainly taking the 
form of consumption (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, pp. 436-437). Boltanski and Chiapello 
succinctly capture the limits of liberation in (neoliberal) capitalism this way (2005, p. 
437): “Although it incorporates the exigency of liberation into its self-description from the 
start, capitalism must therefore also always halt it at a certain point if it is to survive”. It 
seems to us that the implication of positing capitalism – be that in its liberal, social or 
neoliberal form – as the horizon of analysis implies that to become effective, critique has 
to be revolutionary and ultimately demolish the capitalist system. It is not enough to 
transform it as the new form of capitalism will serve to produce new visions of 
emancipation, but it will also establish novel restrictions on the types of emancipation 
allowed. 
 
Second, Boltanski and Chiapello are careful to avoid typical Marxist reduction, which  
subsumes the superstructure of ideas, laws and political institutions to the needs of 
capitalism’s material infrastructure. Yet, they do not hesitate to identify the spirit of 
capitalism as the necessary justification of the wider societal acceptance of capitalism:  
 
‘If … capitalism has not only survived, but ceaselessly expanded its empire, it is because it 
could rely on a number of shared representations – capable of guiding action – and 
justifications, which present an acceptable and desirable order of things: the only possible 
order, or the best of all possible orders’ (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p.10). 
 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2005, pp. xix-xx, 3) are adamant to point out that the spirit or 
justification of capitalism cannot be reduced to the objective needs of capital 
accumulation. Profit making must legitimise itself to be politically and publicly 
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acceptable, while capitalists must refrain from other uses: ‘not all profit is legitimate, not 
all enrichment is just, not all accumulation ... is licit’ (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p. 25). 
This potentially opens up for an analysis of ideas, discourses and rationalities that is more 
nuanced than traditional Marxist analyses. However, this analytical space is limited by 
their assertion that actions can be justified by their contribution to the common good in a 
limited number of ways only. 
 
In On Justification, Boltanski and Thévenot (1991/2006) had found that six different 
forms of justification could be identified in modern Western democracies: industrial, 
domestic, commercial/market, civic, inspirational and reputational. Based on a review of 
the management literature of the 1960s, The New Spirit of Capitalism finds that the 
industrial mode of justification, emphasising the dutiful and efficient execution of given 
tasks in a clearly organised structure, was predominant for a long time (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005, pp. 136-137). A subsequent review of key management literature from 
the 1990s reveals the rise of a new regime of justification: the project or network logic 
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, pp. 104-105). Capitalist production, they argue, is no longer 
primarily organised around vast and fixed lines of administrative and productive 
hierarchies seeking to engender the most optimal division of labour.  
 
Now, capitalist production evolves around rapidly shifting technological and 
organisational set-ups in which production is often organised as temporary projects that 
form the occasion and reason for making network connections. This network or projective 
mode of justification is clear in the tendency to replace a permanently hired workforce 
working within the auspices of a single domestic organisation with temporary employment 
of labour often working on short-term contracts for another company in other countries. 
 
If Boltanski and Chiapello cannot be accused of reductionist Marxism, their analysis of 
managerial discourses is, nevertheless, confined to the dialectics between regimes of 
justification and regimes of capital accumulation, which is inspired by the French 
Regulation School (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p. xviii). The projective type of 
justification is linked to a move towards post-Fordist modes of production and 
consumption, where mass production/consumption is replaced by flexible regimes of 
production and employment and by rapidly shifting forms of consumption. This shift is 
threatened by falling rates of domestic purchasing power. The conclusion is that this type 
of justification acts both to develop and to justify this kind of production. This argument 
seems close to Marxist-inspired scholars who have argued that desires of self-realisation 
have been appropriated from the private sphere by capitalist enterprises to maximise 
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Foucault: Liberal Rationalities of Government at Work  
A Foucauldian approach would largely agree with Boltanski and Chiapello’s diagnosis of 
capitalism during the 1990s: management discourses have undergone substantial 
transformations and the buzzwords of empowerment, entrepreneurship and flexibility have 
become regulative norms. The labour force – even the least qualified and lowest paid 
members – is supposed to emancipate itself through work: each individual must pursue 
and fulfil his/her inner potential, mobilizing it to conduct his/her work more efficiently 
and innovatively.  
 
General agreement between the two notwithstanding, pragmatic sociology and genealogy 
also display a number of differences. These have to do with the unit of analysis and with 
the empirical account of the mutation of managerial discourses. First, what genealogy is 
analysing is not capitalism as a comprehensive economic, social and discursive system of 
exploitation and domination, but instead capitalism as assemblages of political 
rationalities, bodies of administrative and psychological knowledge, organisational 
designs, managerial schemes and petty leadership techniques. Foucault (1981, p. 94) does 
not believe that power in capitalist societies make up a globally uniform hierarchy of 
domination and subordination in which everybody and everything falls into place. This 
does not prevent power relations from producing hegemonic effects of domination, but 
these are always sustained and modified by confrontations throughout networks of 
power/resistance. Hence the need to be concrete and target the critical analyses on the 
actual and diverse functioning of various power-knowledge assemblages.  
 
These assemblages may at best serve as dominant templates of action but in no way 
amount to coherent functional systems. In his lectures at College de France, Foucault 
outlined two distinct forms of neoliberalism emerging in West Germany and the U.S. after 
World War II (Foucault, 2008). Whereas classical liberalism evolved around the question 
of how to avoid the excesses of state intervention in situations that required state power to 
ensure the security of property, production and trade, neoliberalism emerged around the 
problem of how to improve the efficiency and legitimacy of state interventions. The 
market plays a key, albeit differential role, in neoliberal governmentalities. In the U.S. and 
other Anglophone countries the market is considered a regulatory benchmark against 
which the efficiency and quality of public interventions should be assessed. In the West 
German version, the market has to be structured by state interventions, the legitimacy of 
which stems from its ability to ensure the functioning of the market. 
 
Second, Foucauldian-inspired analyses of managerial rationalities took off in the 1960s 
and 1970s. This suggests that these are informed less by sociologists’ or philosophers’ 
critiques of capitalism and more by psychological knowledges and techniques developed 
in civil and military institutions. As shown by Rose and others, psychological knowledge 
and psychological tests and techniques have since the beginning of the 20th century been 
generous in the sense that they have lent themselves to practical uses far from clinics and 
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the universities (Hoskin, 1996; Rose, 1996; 1998; 1999b; Triantafillou, 2003). They have 
been used and developed at workplaces, hospitals, prisons and the military where personal 
skills, mental development, fatigue, combat stress reactions, group dynamics and later 
self-development and empowerment were construed, examined, measured and, eventually, 
rendered susceptible to managerial and political interventions. 
 
These studies show a general mutation in workplace psychology from the 1960s onwards. 
Organisational psychologists like Abraham Maslow (1973), Chris Argyris (1959), 
Douglas McGregor (1960), and Rensis Likert (1961) held that the general problem of most 
companies could be ascribed to a lack of the possibilities for self-actualization and self-
development in work. This psychological problematization of lacking possibilities would 
gradually translate into a generalised call for the need of active and entrepreneurial leaders 
and employees. Accordingly, managers and employees alike were increasingly expected to 
adopt an ethos of entrepreneurship attuned to flexibility and innovation, and employees 
were expected to manage themselves in accordance with organisational values and goals 
(du Gay, Salaman, & Rees, 1996).  
 
Contemporary management then seems to thrive on regulative ideals of entrepreneurship, 
innovation and incessant questioning of contemporary procedures and routines. To agree 
with this diagnosis does not, however, imply that we need to ‘go beyond’ notions of power 
and resistance and collapse them into a singular term, such as ‘struggle’ (Fleming & 
Spicer, 2008). If power is conceived as the more or less systematic attempt to direct the 
conduct of others, and resistance as the more or less systematic attempt to thwart such 
efforts, then they are clearly distinct. While the exercise of power and the attempts to 
resist may share many of the same rationales and strategies and are mutually constitutive, 
they remain different practices.1 What we need to do is analyse how different forms of 
power are actually enacted in organizations or workplaces and assess the kinds of freedom 
they allow and disallow. 
 
Micro: Power and Resistance in Organizations   
The aim of this section is to identify and compare how pragmatic sociology and genealogy 
grasp and analyse practices of power and resistance at the local or micro-level in concrete 
workplaces. We argue that both approaches conceive of power and resistance as two 
distinct practices, both pay attention to indirect forms of power, but that pragmatic 
sociology seems less capable of addressing the power relations imbedded in indirect forms 




1		Foucault was clear on the distinct character of power and resistance interdependence. However,  
he was less clear on whether power should be given primacy over resistance or vice versa 
(Checchi, 2014). 
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Pragmatic Sociology: Mapping Worlds of Justification  
The New Spirit of Capitalism analyzes forms of critique exercised in France to change the 
kinds of exploitation taking place in the post-1990s managerial regime (projective 
justification). The book does not provide any case studies from workplaces but builds its 
analyses from oft quoted management publications. In fairness, the book also draws on a 
number of earlier case studies conducted by Boltanski and Thévenot (1989). However, 
with very few exceptions (Thévenot, 1997), Boltanski, Chiapello and Thévenot have not 
engaged in ethnographic accounts of the power struggles taking place at workplaces since 
the 1990s.  
 
However, a number of less prolific authors have taken up the ideas of the French 
pragmatic sociologists in order to critically address social relations in various 
organisations (Charles, 2012). We find several critical analyses of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) schemes and their attempts to pay attention to the interests of product 
stakeholders. One such study shows how corporations actively work to shape the ideas and 
practices of CSR in ways that do not threaten their commercial interests (Shamir, 2004). 
Others have studied stakeholder networks around sustainable palm oil production in 
Indonesia (Cheyns, 2014; see also Silva-Castañeda, 2012).  
 
These studies illuminate the difficulties that local communities and small-scale farmers 
face when making their voices heard and values accepted in these networks, which tend to 
favour the interests of large corporations. Thus, the stakeholder roundtables promoted by 
global industry certification standards are lending political legitimacy to a form of 
negotiation in which all actors are formally equal, but where the critique and voices of 
smallholders are excluded from the debates (Thévenot 2015a, pp. 213-214). The 
stakeholder roundtables thus serve to legitimize structural inequality in both its economic 
and political dimensions. The moral implication of these studies seems to be that if only 
the local farmers are allowed to participate in policy network in ways that allow them to 
assert their values and interests - if “real” empowerment is allowed to take place - then this 
is morally desirable. Of course, the emancipatory potentials of such projects should not be 
dismissed. Yet, what the studies of these NGO projects do not discuss is the power-laden 
relations ingrained in the very rationale of the quest to empower citizens. As shown by 
several studies, empowerment of marginalized citizens is not (only) about transferring of 
power to those not in power, but (also) a way of governing and disciplining the conduct of 
the marginalized according to liberal norms of citizen conduct (Cruikshank, 1999; Madsen 
and Triantafillou, 2016). For some reason, then, it seems that existing pragmatic sociology 
studies have their ‘eyes closed’ with regard to this aspect of empowerment.  
 
Genealogy: Mapping Techniques of Power  
Foucauldian-inspired organisation and workplace studies have focused on schemes, 
procedures and techniques used in workplaces and the power, knowledge and ethical 
conduct they imply (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).  
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If the focus on normalising knowledge and disciplinary techniques was a common 
denominator of those studies of the forms organizational power that deal with  the 19th and 
early 20th centuries (Foucault, 1977; Hoskin, 1982; Savage, 1998), the studies of 
organisational power in the late 20th century emphasize various form of neoliberal 
government, that is, power based on the facilitation and structuration of forms of freedom 
informed by norms of entrepreneurship, flexibility and innovation. We find a number of 
studies of various forms of managerial power at play in private companies, including 
human resource management (Townley, 1994), just-in-time and customer-oriented 
production management (Miller & O’Leary, 1994), communication and value-based 
management (Alvesson, 1996), management-by-objectives and mentoring (Covaleski, 
Dirsmith, Heian, & Samuel, 1998) and team-based management (McKinlay & Taylor, 
2014). The reforms of higher education emphasizing performance, efficiency and societal 
relevance have been the object of several studies of academic organisations (Harman, 
2014; Ørberg & Wright, 2009; Shore, 2008). A common theme is the critical analysis of 
the relationship between new managerial techniques of performance assessment and the 
remaking of academic subjectivities at both individual and organisational levels.  
 
Many of these studies show, first, that more direct and disciplinary forms of power co-
exist with more indirect forms of power (government). This is interesting but hardly 
surprising and would be expected by pragmatic sociologists with their emphasis of co-
existing and competing forms of worth. Second, in contrast to pragmatic sociology, the 
genealogical case studies also show that the same managerial technology may serve 
different but nonetheless co-existing purposes, namely power and freedom. Here it is 
worth quoting at length from the McKinlay and Taylor’s conclusion following a long-term 
study of the now-closed Motorola factory in Easter Inch, Scotland:  
 
Managing through teams was a technology both to expand individual freedom and to meet 
the challenges of efficiency, flexibility, and innovation that confront all global factories. 
Even a decade and more after the plant closed, time and again, Easter Inch managers spoke 
of their pride in how individuals had improved themselves as a result of their factory 
experience. Such changed selves were testimonies to the ways that empowerment had 
worked — had served its moral, reforming promise (McKinlay & Taylor, 2014, p. 152, 
emphasis in original). 
 
The particular form of managerial power put at play to pursue the goals defined by the 
Motorola company executive hinged on and seemed to allow some degree of employee 
freedom. True, the self-governing practices granted to employees no doubt came with a 
number of severe restrictions; and such practices of freedom had to point to ways that 
would arguably enhance production efficiency and quality. Yet, for all these limitations 
employees were managed neither by means of physical coercion nor detailed disciplinary 
techniques. Rather, they were governed through a form of freedom in which the workers 
were expected to decide in groups on how best to organise their daily work efforts, a form 
of freedom seemingly enjoyed by the Motorola employees. 
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This article has explored and discussed how we may critically address power and 
resistance in the workplace. French pragmatic sociology and Foucauldian-inspired 
genealogy seek to conduct critique in ways that avoid the implications of the elitist 
assumptions associated with various types of ideology critique. 
 
While French pragmatic sociology and Foucauldian genealogy share the ambition of 
opening up critique for less elitist and more democratic forms, they also display two 
substantial differences, which relate to whether effective critique hinges on its place or its 
modality. Firstly, with regard to knowledge, genealogy and pragmatic sociology agree that 
there is no externally given epistemological arbiter that may serve to assess and criticize 
truth claims. Yet, pragmatic sociology deduces from this premise that critique can only 
come from the actors themselves, and more specifically, from those on the receiving end 
of management technologies. Accordingly, there is limited room for knowledgeable 
intellectual critique except as an ethnographic mapper of existing forms of critique. It is 
largely because of this implication that Boltanski (2011) found the need for articulating 
critique from an external vantage point. Genealogy, in contrast, focuses not on the locus of 
those exercising power or of those criticizing it, but on the ways in which 
problematizations and expert knowledge inform and justify the exercise of power. Thus, 
genealogy does not accept the premise that effective critique can only be undertaken by 
certain actors who have access to a certain kind of knowledge. As shown by Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s study, indirect, governmental forms of management at French workplaces owe 
their existence not only to the 1968 movement but also to workplace managers adopting 
these ideas for their own purposes. The managers were thereby instrumental in 
questioning and replacing more direct and authoritarian management styles. Does this 
indicate the end of critique as some authors claim? Our answer is clearly “no”. 
Alternatively, critique would have to be anchored in specific loci identified as being anti-
system or anti-capitalist. However, this is not, as we have argued, a viable approach to 
engaging in critique, partly, for political reasons as critique cannot be the prerogative of a 
specific political programme held by agents who adopt a specific position, and partly 
because it condones a reductionist account of the nature and effects of critique. 
 
Secondly, both pragmatic sociology and genealogy identify a variety of power forms at the 
modern workplace. Yet, in its attempt to criticize power, pragmatic sociology tends to 
focus on domination and repression. This is particularly clear in the writings of Boltanski 
and Chiapello (e.g. Boltanski, 2011), but even in Thévenot’s recent analysis of 
certification and benchmarking, which he characterizes as soft law that works by 
coordination and evaluation (Thévenot 2015a, p. 202), he tends to focus exclusively on the 
repressive dimensions of these forms of power (Thévenot 2015b, p. 102). In contrast, 
genealogy seeks to address the productive forms of power that are more or less dependent 
upon the freedom of those through which power is exercised. Both foci, if pursued too 
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narrowly, are unfavourable for effective critique. Effective critique must address both 
freedom-based forms of power and the strategic moments at which soft forms of power are 
backed up by domination (Dean, 2002). To address the shortcomings of these two 
approaches is not to return to class analysis as suggested by Boltanski (2011, p. 150). 
Instead, in order to provide a better account of critique, we should improve our analytical 
attention to its specific forms (both repressive and non-repressive ones), and to the actual 
outcomes of its exercise (both how freedom and resistance may be appropriated by 
schemes of power and, vice versa, how non-repressive forms of power may enable new 
forms of freedom and resistance). 
 
What then are the methodological implications of this comparative analysis of pragmatist 
sociology and genealogy for the analysis of practices of power and resistance? A full 
account of this would call for another paper, but it seems fair to assert that both 
approaches offer some promising methodological principles. Genealogy is above all 
characterized by “historical document studies” that allows them to unravel the exercise of 
shifting forms of power. While document studies are not new to pragmatic sociology, its 
capacity to unravel the interplay between freedom-based forms of power and resistance 
may be enhanced by paying more attention to policy, expert and NGO documents. Such 
document studies  may unravel the possibilities of freedom and resistance within existing 
schemes of power and could supplement pragmatic sociology’s ethnographic studies of 
how local actors subject themselves to or resist that power. One of the key methodological 
strengths of pragmatic sociology is its sophisticated use of ethnographic studies. As 
genealogists often neglect studying what they argue is of pivotal importance for liberal 
forms of power, namely the freedom of the people subjected this power, they would 
benefit from adopting ethnographic methods in the study of liberal forms of government. 
First, this would allow for an analysis of the coercive dimensions of modern managerial 
power and how employees cope with or attempt to evade such power relations at the 
workplace. Second, the combination of document studies and ethnographic studies would 
enable the interrogation and perhaps destabilization of contemporary hegemonic norms 
and practices not only by exemplifying that things were different in the past, but also by 
showing the existence of norms and practices in the present today that differ from the 
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